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The world has been witnessing a wave of regionalism in recent years. Preferential 
trade arrangements (PTAs) have been a central element of most regional agreements. 
This paper looks at the growing international experience with PTAs. It first provides 
some basic facts on the extent of regionalism and discusses the motives for entering into 
regional arrangements. This is followed by an analysis of the impact of PTAs on trade, 
growth, and welfare, based on traditional and new trade theories. Although the paper 
finds that empirical studies seem to conclude that in practice PTAs are not harmful or 
necessarily very beneficial, the main conclusion of the paper is that regional integration 
can work if done right, and can be pursued in parallel with, or as a stepping-stone 
towards, multilateral trade liberalisation. The paper provides four major 
recommendations to ensure that PTAs have a positive impact on member (and non-
member) countries. These include: (i) a large and diverse membership; (ii) continued 
reduction in external tariffs; (iii) comprehensive product coverage, with simple and 
transparent rules of origin; and (iv) effective implementation. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
While globalisation has been in full swing over the last two decades, the 
world also witnessed a new wave of regionalism taking place in parallel. Almost all 
countries have sought integration with other countries, and not necessarily always 
with neighbours. Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTAs) have been the central 
elements of all regional agreements. Furthermore, successful trade agreements have 
in some cases evolved to a customs union, a common market, and finally to an 
economic and monetary union. 
South Asian countries are also striving for greater regional integration. 
Despite geographic proximity and cultural affinity, South Asian countries, including 
Pakistan, currently barely trade with each other—regional trade is substantially lower 
compared with GDP than in South East Asia and even the Middle East and North 
Africa. The Framework Treaty on creating a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) 
in January 2004 represents an important effort to enhance regional cooperation. 
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Against this background, it may be useful for policy-makers, academics, and society 
in general to look at the growing international experience with PTAs and the 
implications for the design of SAFTA. 
There is no doubt that if PTAs are done right, they can benefit member 
countries.  Many economists argue that regional integration can harm member 
countries if the evolving PTA does not pursue a policy of openness towards other 
countries. By restricting market access of more efficient producers from outside the 
PTA, they can lead to welfare losses at home and abroad, even if this goes hand in 
hand with rising intra-PTA trade flows. But economic theory also offers some broad 
insights for conditions under which these arrangements are likely to be welfare 
enhancing. The main conclusion of this paper is that regional integration, if done 
right, can work. 
And PTAs can be stepping stones toward multilateral liberalisation. Once 
formed, a PTA can be thought of as an entity participating in international trade just 
like individual countries constitute such entities. From international trade theory it 
follows that the best trade policy for this larger entity towards the rest of the world is 
free trade. Thus, it is in a PTA’s own interest to pursue multilateral trade 
liberalisation.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The paper first provides 
some basic facts on the extent of regionalism, and discusses motives for entering into 
regional arrangements (Sections II and III). It then analyses the impact of regional 
integration on member countries based on traditional and new trade theories (Section 
IV), and reviews empirical findings (Section V). The paper also discusses the 
relationship between PTAs and the exchange rate system (Section VI), as well as the 
challenges for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) arising from regional 
integration (Section  VII). Finally, it proposes some lessons for making regional 
economic integration work (Section VIII).  
 
II.  THE EXTENT OF REGIONAL AGREEMENTS 
The world has recently seen a remarkable proliferation of regional and 
bilateral PTAs. Since 1990, the number of PTAs—with the 25 member European 
Union (EU) counting as one country—has more than quadrupled to about 230 by late 
2004.
1 The World Trade Organisation (WTO) estimates that another 60 
arrangements are in various stages of negotiation. This means that, if all these come 
into effect, there will be nearly twice as many PTAs as there are WTO members.  
Today, nearly every country belongs to at least one PTA and numerous 
countries are party to several agreements. The average number of PTAs per country 
according to recent World Bank estimates is six. Industrial countries have concluded 
the most PTAs, with an average number of 13. A substantial number of developing 
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countries have signed bilateral preferential agreements with an industrial country. 
Interestingly, there are as yet no countries in South Asia that have signed a bilateral 
agreement with an industrial partner.  
The increasing number of PTAs that include a large industrial country 
suggests a growing importance of a “hub-and-spoke” structure in world trade. In a 
hub-and-spoke system, the largest countries sign bilateral agreements with many 
small countries. Such a system could marginalise the spokes, where market access 
conditions are much less advantageous than in the hub, which enjoys improved 
access to all of the spokes. At the same time, however, a growing number of 
overlapping PTAs has resulted in a “spaghetti bowl” of trade relations, improving 
market access among smaller countries, but resulting in a complex myriad of trade 
rules and procedures that can be difficult to administer and that may actually hinder 
trade.  
The share of global trade taking place between PTA members is growing, as 
the number of agreements is increasing, and has reached almost 40 percent of total 
world trade. Intra-regional trade is particularly large within Europe and Asia: in the 
EU-15, about 60 percent of the countries’ external trade remains within the region 
and in East Asia the share is about 50 percent. In other regions, however, the share of 
intra-regional trade is much lower.  
The share of global trade that PTAs are affecting, however, is believed to have 
been declining. This reflects the overall trend toward lower tariffs, especially in the 
United States and the EU, and that the tariff schedules of many PTA participants 
include zero most favoured nation (MFN) rates. In fact, almost two-thirds of the 
decline in average tariffs in developing countries during the last two  decades is 
estimated by the World Bank to have come from unilateral reductions, as distinct 
from the one quarter coming out of the Uruguay round and the remaining 10 percent 
from PTAs. Thus, while 40 percent of global trade takes place within PTAs, the 




III.  MOTIVES FOR ENTERING INTO REGIONAL  
ARRANGEMENTS 
Countries enter PTAs for a variety of reasons, the most obvious one being to 
enhance trade and thus to achieve higher levels of economic growth and material 
welfare. Countries participating in PTAs often seek to secure access to large markets, 
such as the United States or the EU. However, developing countries often already 
enjoy considerable access to these markets because trade barriers on industrial 
products are typically low, or because they benefit from unilateral measures, such as 
the Generalised System of Preferences, or the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity 
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Act. At the same time, agricultural products, an area where developing countries 
could reap major benefits, are usually excluded from regional agreements. Still, the 
motive for increased market access, however partial, remains powerful for many, 
especially developing countries. 
Entering into a regional agreement may give a small country an advantage 
over other similar countries in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). Raising the 
level of FDI—or domestic investment, for that matter—requires making a country 
attractive vis-à-vis other countries, and increasing market size helps in this regard. 
Ensuring market access to a major market by entering a PTA may be one way of 
achieving this. 
A regional agreement can also help dealing with region-specific issues, such 
as border controls, transit, migration, or movement of labour. Countries recognise 
that other, more opaque barriers than tariffs, such as border controls, fito-sanitary 
restrictions, weak transport systems, and regulatory differences, can also hinder 
trade. PTAs therefore increasingly cover some of these issues, which are more 
suitably addressed at the regional level. Some PTAs have also included dispute 
resolution mechanisms, which in the implementation phase of the arrangement have 
proven to be extremely useful.   
PTAs can reinforce internal regulatory or structural reforms, through external 
treaty obligations and visible political commitments. Often, small countries 
participating in a PTA have just made, or are trying to push ahead, major reforms. 
Locking in such reforms clearly motivated agreements between the EU and countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Another example is the case of Mexico in the context 
of NAFTA. 
For large industrial countries, trade in goods per se no longer appears to be the 
dominant factor for participating in PTAs. A growing number of PTAs includes 
provisions on liberalising services (including financial), investment, protecting 
intellectual property rights, labour and environmental standards, and dispute 
resolution. Industrial countries are keen to include such issues to counter what they 
regard as unfair competition due to, for example, piracy or poor labour standards, 
and to open up markets for their services sectors, where they have a comparative 
advantage. 
Political goals are another important reason to enter into a PTA. Countries that 
may have far-reaching integration as a goal, typically start out with trade agreements 
as a first step toward a deepening of political relationships. The EU is a clear 
example of this: initial agreements covered trade and investment, and have 
culminated in the current economic and monetary union. Similarly, forging bilateral 
and regional trade ties is often linked to geopolitical and security considerations. 
Trade policy is a key instrument of foreign policy for the EU and the United States, 
which use PTAs to secure regional stability by promoting the development of 
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to participate in a regional initiative, such as the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), and MERCOSUR in Latin America.  
A last reason to enter into regional agreements may be defensive. As more and 
more countries enter into regional agreements, the cost of nonparticipation rises. 
While some countries may prefer the multilateral route, they may also feel that not 
entering into regional agreements can lead to a competitive disadvantage relative to 
countries that have entered into PTAs.  
While PTAs are signed for a variety of reasons, the impact on trade, growth, 
and employment seems crucial in determining the extent to which broader objectives 
are achieved. It is difficult to identify arrangements that have advanced wider 
political objectives, without having first achieved progress in enhancing trade and 
having seen this reflected in higher rates of sustainable growth and employment 
creation. Thus, it appears that the willingness to accept trade liberalisation and the 
accompanying economic adjustments is a first step that may be indicative of progress 
than can be made in other areas. 
 
IV.  THE THEORETICAL CASE FOR AND AGAINST  
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
The impact of regional integration—and PTAs in particular—on member 
countries (as well as nonmembers) can differ substantially depending on specific 
circumstances. PTAs can lead to increased trade among members, but also to 
reduced trade with nonmembers. In addition to pure trade effects, PTAs can 
strengthen investment and growth of member countries and may create pressures and 
opportunities for further integration, particularly in the financial area. 
The theoretical literature on regional trade integration covers every side of 
the argument. One way of looking at this is that economists are clever at fine-
tuning assumptions to reach a particular conclusion. Another way is to read these 
diverging results as giving some indications under which conditions a PTA can be 
welfare enhancing. The diverging nature of results stems largely from different 
approaches to modelling. Models based on traditional trade theory tend to find 
PTAs being potentially welfare reducing. However, models based on new trade 
theories find PTAs to provide avenues for welfare improvements that arise in a 
dynamic context. 
In traditional trade theory, PTAs can be welfare reducing if they shift 
trade from a low cost source outside the PTA to a higher cost source inside the 
PTA. Lowering trade barriers in a PTA leads to increased trade between members 
(trade creation). As these countries specialise according to their comparative 
advantage, their consumption possibilities increase. However, lowering trade barriers 
in a PTA can also lead to trade diversion from a cheaper source in a non-PTA 
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advantage because of tariff protection.
3 Consumers still get the good cheaper than 
before the PTA was introduced so that they realise a pecuniary gain. However, the 
importing country loses tariff revenue by shifting to an intra-PTA source. A priori it 
is not clear whether the direct gain for consumers is larger or smaller than the tariff 
revenue loss, in particular if the government has to increase taxes to make up for the 
lost revenue. Thus, the welfare impact of a PTA can be positive or negative. 
PTAs can lead to a deterioration of member countries’ terms of trade. In case 
a PTA leads to trade diversion from a low cost third country to a higher cost intra-
PTA source, the member country’s import price increases, even though domestic 
consumer prices are lower on account of the tariff reduction. However, there is also 
scope for terms of trade improvements over time through productivity gains on 
account of increased import competition and technology transfers.
4 
PTA members can minimise trade diversion effects. Trade diversion arises 
because an external tariff provides a price advantage to an intra-PTA supplier. 
Therefore, adopting low external tariffs will minimise trade diversion by creating a 
more level playing field for intra- and extra-PTA suppliers. One rule of thumb could 
be that PTAs should adopt the lowest external tariff in effect in a member country 
before the PTA was set up.
5 Trade diversion effects will also be small for countries 
that enter a PTA with a large partner (in terms of absolute size and diversification) 
because the large partner’s relative prices are closely aligned with relative world 
prices.
6 
Trade diversion may also be low if PTA members are natural trading 
partners. Natural trading partners are countries that engage in substantial trade 
independent of the tariff regime. For example, neighbouring countries tend to 
trade more because of transportation costs, cultural affinity, or similar levels of 
development and thus consumption preferences. As such, a PTA among natural 
trading partners provides substantial scope for trade creation, but little scope for 
trade diversion because member countries trade largely with each other and not 
with nonmembers.
7  
New trade theories based on imperfect competition and economies of scale 
suggest advantages of PTAs, in particular in a dynamic framework. Traditional 
trade theory is typically based on perfect competition, constant returns to scale, 
and abstracts from innovations. As such, dynamic gains from having a first 
mover advantage, acquiring new ideas, large scale production or agglomeration 
do not feature. New trade theory explores these factors and how they interact 
with PTAs. 
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PTAs allow better exploitation of economies of scale. PTAs increase the 
market size for producers and allow them to move down the average cost curve by 
exploiting economies of scale. Assuming free market entry, this will benefit 
consumers in the form of lower prices. Moreover, investment can increase because 
the associated fixed costs are spread over a larger market size, which raises 
productivity and output. With heterogeneous goods, consumers will also enjoy more 
variety. And when allowing for innovations that involve significant up front fixed 
research and development (R&D) costs, a larger market also leads to increased R&D 
and thus innovation. 
PTAs can also enhance investment and thus growth. A PTA can trigger 
increases in both domestic and foreign direct investment because of the increased 
market size. However, such investment is likely to be geographically concentrated 
within the PTA so that not all member countries may benefit alike. As such, a 
country with an initial advantage compared to other members could end up with 
most of the benefits resulting from a PTA. Creating a good investment climate then 
becomes important to attract investment and harness its benefits.
8  
New trade theory-type considerations may be particularly relevant for South-
South PTAs. South-South PTAs typically provide less scope for gains from trade on 
account of production complementarities or differences in factor endowments. 
However, gains from trade may arise through similar mechanisms as in North-North 
trade. South-South PTAs increase market size and can therefore lead to gains on 
account of economies of scale. Domestic investment as well as FDI may rise as a 
larger market makes higher up front costs profitable. Gains from specialisation can 
be realised by breaking up the value added chain, including for commodities that will 
eventually be exported from the PTA.  
In general, it is advantageous for PTAs to offer open access to countries 
wanting to join. Once a PTA has been established, it has similar interests in regional 
and global trade liberalisation as an individual country. As such, having a new 
member join the PTA provides scope for further trade creation. Moreover, market 
size effects on investment and growth, and advantages from economies of scale 
arise. Therefore, building on the same rationale underlying PTAs in the first place, 
PTAs should welcome any country wanting to join as a general policy, though, in 
practice, the process of joining can be quite complex and involve a variety of 
considerations.   
 
V.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF  
    PREFERENTIAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS 
Trade liberalisation and openness are closely linked with economic growth. This 
proposition is widely supported by empirical studies. Therefore, one would also expect to 
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find a strong link between PTAs and growth. The link between PTAs and growth, 
however, is less researched. While some studies find that PTAs that substantially enlarge 
the market size have a positive effect on growth, others fail to find a positive impact.
9 
This may be an indication that PTAs do not always result in a significant increase in 
openness, or in some cases may even reduce the overall level of openness. 
On balance, empirical studies seem to conclude that PTAs are not harmful, 
though not necessarily very beneficial either. Perhaps reflecting the theoretical 
uncertainties discussed above, empirical studies arrive at different results regarding 
the impact of PTAs. Very few studies find outright harmful effects from trade 
diversion. However, it also seems difficult to identify clear-cut positive effects. This 
may partly reflect the fact that regionalism, in particular in the 1990s, took place in 
parallel with multilateral opening and trends generally described as ‘globalisation’. 
As such, PTA-specific effects may be difficult to separate from the multitude of 
other developments.  
Many PTAs do not appear to lead to substantially increased trade flows between 
member countries. A large study covering 58 countries and nine PTAs found no 
indication that PTAs lead to an increase in trade volumes.
10,11 Moreover, it did not find 
the new surge in regionalism of the 1990s to have resulted in increased trade between 
PTA members.
 Some more recent papers, however, did find some trade creation effects 
from NAFTA and MERCOSUR.
12 And, looking at South-South type PTAs in central 
Europe and the Baltics, another recent study finds increased trade flows resulting from 
PTAs, suggesting that even in the absence of production structure and endowment 
complementarities, there is scope for trade creation.
13 
There is mixed evidence for trade diversion. A number of studies analysing 
the effects of NAFTA, MERCOSUR and other PTAs find some trade diversion, 
although the effects are in most cases relatively small. Moreover, the conclusion 
seems to be that while recent PTAs are associated with trade diversion, this is 
typically dominated by trade creation.
14  
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However, there is some evidence that PTAs raise investment. Several studies 
find that the increased market size of PTAs has a positive impact on FDI received by 
member countries.
15 This effect was more pronounced in the 1990s when PTAs 
became more widespread. Others, however, find only broad trade liberalisation to 
lead to increased investment, while entering into a PTAs does not.
16 A recent IMF 
study shows that FDI tends to be regionally concentrated within an PTA, 
emphasising the need for countries to strengthen their investment climate when 
entering a PTA.
17  
South-South PTAs may have less scope for gains from trade integration.
18 
First, they typically have much smaller markets than North-South or North-North 
agreements. Second, there is less scope for gains from comparative advantage 
because production structures and factor endowments tend to be similar. Third, 
South-South agreements may create less incentives to advance structural reforms 
than North–South agreements. Using a global model, the World Bank simulated the 
effects of South-South PTAs and found no overwhelming economic benefit from 
such PTAs for member countries.
19 Since the theoretical gains in South-South 
arrangements may not be as large, such PTAs should put additional emphasis on 
lowering trade related costs such as customs procedures and diverging standards to 
enhance intra-PTA trade flows. In addition, this also underlines the importance for 
South-South PTAs to pursue an outward strategy of multilateral liberalisation.  
PTAs can be part of a virtuous circle of trade liberalisation and trade 
expansion. The example of East Asia shows how increased intra-regional trade can 
go hand in hand with increased extra-regional trade, contributing to sustained high 
levels of growth. In addition, successful PTAs typically emerge in existing trading 
blocs rather than creating them. 
Restrictive rules of origin can erode advantages from PTAs. Rules of origin 
define the circumstances under which an import from outside the PTA can be 
traded within the PTA. Typically, these rules prescribe some local content 
requirement to allow an import to be traded under PTA conditions—rules of origin 
are considered necessary to prevent transhipping through the lowest external tariff 
PTA member. More complex, restrictive rules can be product specific and may 
involve multiple criteria. These rules can also be used as nontariff trade barriers to 
reduce intra-PTA trade. Customs administration faces particular challenges if 
treatment is not uniform across different products, or if a country is a member of 
more than one PTA, which can lead to lengthy clearance processes and imply 
significant costs for the private sector. By reducing intra-PTA trade in this manner, 
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complex rules of origin erode the possible welfare gains from PTAs. It is therefore 
crucial that these rules are kept simple and that customs administration is well-
equipped to implement them. 
PTAs can lead to revenue losses for the member countries, at least in the short 
run. Tariff reductions associated with trade liberalisation naturally entail the risk of 
falling government revenues. PTAs are no exception to this. Also, customs 
administration faces particular challenges to safeguard revenue by properly 
identifying imports from non-member countries. Given heavy dependence on trade 
taxes in many developing countries, tariff reductions are likely to lead to significant 
revenue losses, in particular when intra-regional trade is important and common 
external tariffs are also reduced. Early measures to offset potential revenue losses are 
needed, such as strengthening tax administration, or reinforcing the consumption and 
income tax systems. Over time, though, there can be a positive impact from PTAs on 
revenue, if trade liberalisation leads to a better resource allocation, stimulating 
growth, and, in turn, tax revenues.  
 
VI.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PTAS AND THE  
EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEM 
What is the relationship between PTAs and the exchange rate system? At first 
glance, there does not seem to be a strong association in practice between PTAs and 
exchange rate regimes. Looking at existing customs unions, there are some currency 
unions (the EU, WAEMU, and CEMAC, and the ECCU within CARICOM), but 
others are an eclectic combination of pegs or managed floats against each other’s 
currencies and vis-à-vis outside currencies. 
It does appear that in PTAs with high levels of intra-regional trade the 
exchange rate regime is an important issue. When a PTA is successful in the area of 
trade liberalisation, this can be expected to lead to further integration, particularly 
financial integration. Financial integration typically follows trade integration, as 
banks follow their customers. But with increasing cross-border financial flows, the 
threat to exchange rate stability grows as well. 
Uncertainty over exchange rates could affect trade directly, because it can 
wipe out profit margins, and indirectly because it can misdirect investment, although 
the literature is ambiguous about the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade 
flows. The impact of exchange rate instability may actually be more damaging 
within a PTA.
20 An exchange rate crisis in one member may adversely affect trade 
and FDI flows to other members, and possibly, through contagion, triggering 
currency crises in these other members as well. Members that lose competitiveness 
may resort to increased protectionism, either vis-à-vis the rest of the world by raising 
outside tariffs, resulting in more trade diversion, or vis-à-vis other members through 
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less transparent non-tariff barriers, thus defeating the purpose of the PTA. Countries 
may even choose to scale back or completely abandon their trade agreements. The 
1999 devaluation of the Brazilian real, for example, strained the relationship between 
Argentina and Brazil, and gave rise to protectionist pressures, businesses threatening 
to relocate, and added to pressures on the Argentine peso. 
Thus, within a PTA, in the same way as trade integration can create 
pressures for financial liberalisation, financial integration and liberalisation may 
call for increasingly reliable exchange rate stability.
21  One way to reduce the risks 
associated with exchange rate volatility within PTAs is of course to already take 
into account the potential divergence in exchange rate regimes when choosing 
partners. Countries with lower volatility (e.g. developed countries) and countries 
with similar exchange rate regimes and similar macroeconomic patterns would 
make better PTA partners. 
Promoting exchange rate stability requires greater macroeconomic policy 
coordination. The need for policy coordination depends not only on trade integration, 
but also on the degree of factor mobility across borders, both labour and capital. The 
deeper the economic integration, the more coordinated should be macroeconomic 
policy. One extreme is the possibility of a monetary union, which would completely 
eliminate exchange rate instability. Recent empirical work suggest that monetary 
unions may have a significant impact on trade: other things the same, countries that 
share a common currency trade three times as much as countries whose currencies 
are independent of each other.
22  One caveat, though: the effect of a monetary union 
on a country’s trade is stronger if the partner is one with whom one already trades. 
This implies that the option of adopting a common currency may not be as beneficial 
for some countries as adopting the U.S. dollar or the Euro. Short of a monetary 
union, coordination between national currencies may take the form of pegging to the 
currency of the lead country in the PTA, or ensuring consistency with respect to an 
outside benchmark currency, or a basket of currencies, so that bilateral exchange 
movements within a PTA are limited. 
 
VI.  THE IMF AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
The wave of regionalism also affects the work of the IMF.  The IMF’s   
Articles of Agreement call upon the Fund to “... facilitate the expansion and balanced 
growth of international trade and to contribute thereby to the promotion and 
maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the development 
of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic 
policy”.  As such, the IMF supports PTAs that are consistent with this mandate. The 
main pillars of the IMF’s involvement in regional initiatives are regional surveillance 
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and technical assistance to regional institutions and to individual countries in a 
regional context, including through regional TA centres such as the recently 
established Middle East Technical Assistance Centre. 
The IMF is increasingly conducting its surveillance at a regional level. Most 
notably, regional surveillance takes place for currency unions. In 1998, the IMF 
adopted formal procedures for surveillance of the euro area, making discussions with 
its regional institutions an integral part of the IMF’s Article IV surveillance over its 
members. There are annual missions to the euro area to conduct these so-called 
Article IV consultations, similar to those of other member countries, though with a 
focus on monetary, exchange rate and trade policy. Fiscal and structural policies 
continue to be discussed largely as part of the individual Article IV consultations 
with the euro area member countries. Surveillance of the euro area has also dealt 
with the payments system.  
Surveillance of other regional arrangements is also evolving. The IMF sends 
annual missions to the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), and 
has prepared annual reports since 1998. Likewise, annual reports for the Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) have been prepared since 
1999. Most recently, regional consultations with the East Caribbean Currency Union 
(ECCU) have commenced in 2002, though policy discussions had been going on for 
some time longer. In all of these cases, regional surveillance focuses inter alia on 
monetary and exchange rate policy, competitiveness, convergence, trade policy and 
financial sector supervision. In the case of the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC), 
regional issues are taken up in the context of discussions with individual member 
countries but Fund management also meets collectively with senior officials of the 
GCC. In addition, research at the IMF has, for example, looked at labour market 
problems across GCC members. 
Regional surveillance covers a broad range of activities. The IMF produces 
semi-annual and annual regional outlooks that analyse macroeconomic developments 
in a regional context and cover specific cross-country issues. For example, the most 
recent regional outlook from the IMF’s Middle East and Central Asia Department, 
which includes Pakistan, focused on financial sector developments. Another recent 
IMF study analysed financial integration of Central American Free Trade Agreement 
member countries, drawing in part on country-specific Financial System Stability 
Assessments.
23 Typically, IMF surveillance evolves when there are regional 
institutions as centralised counterparts. 
The IMF also provides technical assistance to regional institutions. Technical 
assistance has addressed issues such as customs and domestic tax regimes. For 
example, the IMF has been involved in trade facilitation in Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) countries such as in the Arab MAGHREB Union and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council. Likewise, the IMF has assisted ECOWAS and UEMOA 
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member countries to implement a coordinated customs tariff reform. The IMF has 
also advised the East African Customs Union on harmonising tax incentives to avoid 
harmful tax competition among member countries.  
Over the last couple of years, the IMF has established several regional centres 
for providing technical assistance, in Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean, and the 
Pacific islands. These regional centres aim to enhance the effectiveness of the IMF’s 
technical assistance to the participating countries. They allow for a more rapid 
response to emerging TA needs; for closer coordination with other TA providers and 
with regional institutions; and for more efficient and sustained assistance for regional 
integration initiatives. Technical assistance is provided by a team of IMF experts 
assigned to each centre, supplemented by short-term specialists contracted to provide 
targeted advice and training. The assistance mainly takes the form of in-country 
workshops, training assignments to institutions in member countries, and regional 
training courses. 
 
VII.  SOME LESSONS FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
PTAs as part of a regional integration process can work. Positive outcomes 
will depend on design and implementation. What are the key ingredients of success? 
Four major factors are: 
  (i) A large and diverse membership; 
  (ii) Continued reduction in external tariffs;  
  (iii) Comprehensive product coverage, with simple and transparent rules of 
origin; and 
 (iv)  Effective  implementation. 
A large and diverse PTA membership can increase the likelihood that the 
production and trade structures of PTA members are complementary, and that 
members can take advantage of economies of scale. Comparative advantages may be 
easier to identify and exploit in North-South PTAs. But South-South agreements can 
have a large and broad membership as well, including in East and South Asia. In any 
event, the key lesson appears to be that PTAs should maintain open access and allow 
countries outside the PTA to join as easily as possible; membership negotiations thus 
need to be facilitated.  
Continuing to lower external tariffs after establishing the PTA is essential for 
reducing trade diversion. This is particularly important when trade barriers against 
non-members are high (as in South Asia) and could result in large trade diversion. 
Experience suggests that members will experience gains in welfare, if after the 
establishment of a PTA, growth of imports is evident from all countries, not just 
PTA partners, as was the case with the EU. In addition, low external tariffs also 
improve the competitiveness of the domestic export industry, which is important for 
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Comprehensive product coverage within a PTA ensures that high as well as 
low tariffs are reduced. Otherwise, benefits to participants would be small, and 
welfare losses would result from firms moving towards less efficient industries 
where protection is enjoyed. In practice, textiles, agriculture and services are often 
exempt or subject to long adjustment periods. This results in large welfare losses, 
with developing countries often suffering the most. If exemptions are unavoidable, a 
short negative list, listing only those goods and services for which tariffs are not or 
less reduced, is preferable to a positive list, because with a negative list new goods 
and services would automatically benefit from the lower tariffs. 
Liberal, transparent, clear, and consistent rules of origin are needed. Rules of 
origin are essential for implementing a PTA that is not yet a customs union. The 
more liberal rules tend to apply a general rule on the percentage of local value added 
that is required for preferential access. Increased cost of compliance on account of a 
proliferation of PTAs with complex rules of origin can create substantial problems, 
especially in countries with less capacity. 
Implementation matters—signing a PTA is not enough. Agreements are often 
not implemented because interest groups stop them. In practice, PTAs are often 
signed with a political objective but, after lengthy negotiation, turn out much more 
restrictive than initially intended. In implementing PTAs, politicians need to bear in 
mind that regional integration can only be successful if it unleashes new competition 
that lowers domestic prices and introduces new technology. As with multilateral 
liberalisation, exposing members to competition results in benefits, but this can also 
cause some pain. Governments need to recognise this and be prepared for it, 
including through providing an appropriate social safety net. 
Finally, the IMF supports efforts to enhance regional cooperation in South 
Asia, and we encourage Pakistan to pursue integration under the SAFTA 
framework. The potential for trade creation and increasing welfare is large in light 
of the current very low level of regional integration. But the high levels of 
protection presently associated with most countries in the region also gives rise to 
risks of trade diversion. Therefore, trade liberalisation under SAFTA, needs to be 
complemented in Pakistan and other member countries with continued unilateral 
trade liberalisation vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Unless the high external 
protection levels for some sectors are dismantled in parallel, regional tariff cuts 
could lead to substantial trade diversion. On the issue of how to make SAFTA 
itself as effective as possible, exemptions to the agreement need to be minimised. 
The sensitive goods lists and the possibility of temporary suspension of 
concessions should therefore also be minimised. Liberal rules of origin need to be 
negotiated under the agreement. Trade facilitation by means of harmonisation of 
standards and customs procedures, and cooperation in transport infrastructure is 
also important. Back-loaded tariff cuts are possible under the agreement, but this 
would limit the economic impact of SAFTA. Regional Economic Integration  349
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